The Dynamic Turn in logic makes actions of communication and general information update into explicit objects of investigation. This paper is a brief tour of this research program in a new version, bringing together ideas from logic, philosophy, computer science, and game theory.
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Moreover, further influences have come from process theories in computer science, as well as game theory, and this contact between disciplines is still continuing. This paper sketches one trajectory of 'dynamification', reflecting my personal interests.
A much broader survey is given in van Benthem 1996.
From epistemic logic to communication there is more. The fact that I am asking you indicates that I think it is at least possible that you know the answer. 3 Now to the effects of the answer. By telling me, you make me learn the relevant fact P. But more is true afterwards. You know that I know, I know that you know that I know, and so on to any depth of iteration. We achieve what is called common knowledge in the philosophical and logical literature. These are the so-called postconditions of a truthful answer. 4 Incidentally, most preconditions and postconditions noted here involve knowledge about other people's knowledge. This may seem a somewhat redundant social sideeffect of communication. But in reality, such iterated knowledge levels are often crucial to effective physical action. Suppose that I know that you have stolen my watch and are now wearing it, but also I know that you do not know that I know it.
Questions and answers
Then I will try to quickly grab it back. But if I think that you may know that I know 2 At least, according to the little globe standing on my desk as I write this.
3 These are normal cooperative questions. Neither condition holds when a teacher asks a didactical question to students in class -or in games, where questions may serve to mislead an opponent.
3 you have it (note that this involves 3 iterations!), I must retrieve my stolen watch in some more sophisticated manner. Thus both communication and genuine physical action involve careful handling of knowledge assertions of various shades.
Epistemic logic
The preconditions and postconditions of the preceding episode can be written in standard epistemic logic, which is an excellent formalism for displaying knowledge about facts and about other people's information. For instance, the question indicated that the following was true, with K for the epistemic modal operator "knows that" and <> for the dual modality "holds it possible that":
Moreover, after the answer has been given, the following are true:
all the way to common knowledge C {you, I} P.
More precisely, these epistemic formulas refer to the usual semantic models
for epistemic logic, consisting of a set W of possible worlds (the ways the actual world might be), accessibility relations ~j for each agent j, and a valuation function V giving each proposition letter a truth value in each world. A formula K j P is then true at a world s if P is true in all worlds t with s ~j t . The much stronger formula C G P is true if P holds at all worlds that are reachable from s by any finite chain s ~j t ~j k ...
where the relations may be for arbitrary agents. For convenience, one often assumes that the ~j are equivalence relations, making the logic a poly-modal S5 system in a language with a common knowledge operator. But similar ideas will work for much weaker logics, modeling agents' belief instead of knowledge. For instance, here is a simple statement, that may seem obvious:
Dynamics: changing information states
We will see later how plausible this is as a general logical law of communication. As another illustration, here is a valid principle in the obvious semantics relating knowledge achieved after a public announcement to what agents know beforehand:
This says that knowledge of ¢ afterwards corresponds to knowledge of a suitably relativized version of ¢ beforehand. This is just one law for reasoning about communication in a complete system of dynamic-epistemic logic for public announcement which is known to be axiomatizable and decidable. This seems the simplest logical calculus of communication. 6 More sophisticated systems exist for more complex product updates. Thus, dynamic-epistemic logic promises a more systematic logical taxonomy and understanding of general communication . Thus, a dynamic superstructure may also suggest modifications of its static base structure. 
Analyzing speech acts

As this question-answer episode repeats, what will happen?
Nobody knows in the first round. But upon seeing this, the muddy children will both know in the second round, as each of them can argue as follows:
"If I were clean, the one dirty child I see would have seen only clean children around her, and so she would have known that she was dirty at once. But she did not. So I must be dirty, too!" This reasoning is symmetric for both muddy children -so both know in the second round. The third child knows it is clean one round later, after they announced that.
The puzzle is easily generalized to other numbers of clean and dirty children.
It involves an iteration "keep stating your ignorance until you know", which may be repeated any number of times, depending on the composition of the group. enough to encode significant mathematical problems! This is one of many 'complexity thresholds' in the spectrum of human communicative activities.
Revising beliefs and expectations
From update to revision Information update is just one cognitive activity that we engage in. Another key source for the Dynamic Turn is the theory of belief revision (Gärdenfors & Rott 1995) , which highlights the interplay of three processes: An example of the latter move is the modern theory of learning mechanisms, merging ideas from the philosophy of science, mathematical topology, and computer science.
Hendricks 2002 makes an extensive plea for the broad epistemological relevance of this move. Update, revision, and learning form a coherent family of issues, going upward in complexity and range from short-term to long-term cognitive behaviour.
Van Benthem 2003A discusses the whole picture in some more detail. Games are a model for a group of agents trying to achieve certain goals through interaction. They involve two new notions compared with what we had before: agents' preferences among possible outcome states, and their longer-term strategies providing successive responses to the others' actions over time. In particular, strategies take us from the micro-level to a description of longer-term behaviour.
Conversation games Consider two people who are not equally informed. I do not know if we are in Holland (P) or not (¬P), and if the year is 2004 (T) or not (¬T).
You know that I do not know the place, but think that I might know about the time.
But I do know whether we are together for a good reason (R), whereas you don't. In fact, we are in Holland in 2004, and indeed for a good reason. Here is a concrete epistemic model for this situation, with the black dot indicating the actual world:
P, T, R 1 ¬P, ¬T, R 2 2 P, T, ¬R 1 ¬P, T, ¬R
Now we want to discover the true situation -and the one who finds out first wins.
I can ask you a question first, and it needs to be genuine: in particular, I do not know its answer. Then you can ask, and so on. At each stage, someone who knows the precise facts can announce this, and wins. (There might be a draw if both announce simultaneously). Now I can clearly ask better or worse questions.
Suppose I ask you about the time. Then you learn that I do not know if T holds, which eliminates the two bottommost worlds. But then you know the facts (as we are really in the black world with P, T, R, and there are no uncertainty lines from there left for you), and so you win at once. Therefore, I should rather ask about the place (P). This gives away no information which you don't already have, because it is compatible with all four worlds. But your positive answer eliminates the two right-most worlds, after which I know the facts and you still do not know about R.
This choice between better and worse questions (or things to say in general) is the beginning of a game dynamics of conversation, where players must select questions so as to profit most while leaving their opponents in the dark as much as possible. (Parikh 1985 , Abramsky 1998 .
Game logics
The other side of the contact between logic and game theory are logical investigations of deliberation, decision and action by players. For general games, this involves an abstraction step as compared with the earlier update logics. We have a complete game tree of all possible moves, with players' turns indicated at the nodes, and we wish to analyze which particular sequence(s) of actions will be taken by agents who can reflect on their strategies. For a simple example, consider the following three game trees, with respective values for A, E indicated at the end:
Each of these games is a model for a modal logic of its basic actions -in this case, 'left', 'right'. Game structure and strategies may then be formulated in standard terms. 12 E.g., out of her 4 possible strategies (maps from turns to moves), the best strategy for E in the first game (a) is to do the opposite of what A has done:
"if he has gone left, go right -if he has gone right, go left" # This strategy is a simple program that can be studied in a standard dynamic logic (van Benthem 2001B) . Interpreting the value '1' as 'winning', we see that this is a winning strategy for player E: by following it, she wins no matter what A plays. Most logic games go no further than this notion. But in the middle game (b), with finer preferences among outcomes, better predictions can be made. Again E will play strategy # at her two turns, assuming she is rational. But given that, A will choose left, as it will give him 1/2, as opposed to the 0 on the right. This predicts the unique 'subgame-perfect' Nash equilibrium of this game, which lets E play her winning strategy, while A plays 'left'. In logical terms, an argument like this involves expressions for values of nodes, perhaps even a full-fledged preference logic. knowledge. This language can express special information patterns in games, such as the fact that player E does not know which move will make her win:
It can also express general laws describing special types of agent. Van Benthem 2001A has typical illustrations of this interface between logical and game-theoretic notions. For instance, players j with perfect recall of the past history of the game will have an ignorance pattern satisfying this knowledge-action interchange axiom: there will be an uncertainty line for me between them. Now, successive layers of the game tree arise by computing successive update products in the sense of Section 2:
Given this special update mechanism, their pattern of dotted lines for the complete game tree will satisfy special requirements (one of them is the above perfect recall), which can be determined precisely. The full story is in van Benthem 2001A.
Managing expectations But information update by observed events is only half of the story of reasoning in games. Even when they know the whole game structure perfectly well, including all past moves, players still play a game with expectations about their own future behaviour and that of others -and that anticipation is also the essence of all human activity. Finite versus infinite Games seem finite terminating activities, like proofs or talks.
But computer science also studies useful infinite processes, like the running of an operating system allowing many special-purpose programs to perform finite tasks.
The same dichotomy occurs with cognitive processes in the Dynamic Turn. Some activities are meant to terminate, others provide the operating system for these.
Examples of the latter are logical proof systems, or Grice's well-known maxims in running conversation. Likewise, game theory also studies infinite games and players' behaviour in them, such as repeated Prisoner's Dilemma in social co-operation.
Temporal logic To study these phenomena, the above logical systems need to be embedded in a temporal system, allowing for discussion of epistemic multi-agent protocols over time, and other long-run notions. E.g., a protocol may encode general regularities relevant to communication, like my knowing that you speak the truth only half of the time. The usual picture here is the familiar Tree of forking paths:
13 Abstract games and update by observing moves still relate to concrete conversation in many ways. Suppose that players have already chosen their strategies in a game tree, but the art is now to find out where the game will end. The player to know this first gets a prize. This is again an imperfect information game where information can be revealed through statements and questions.
In particular, just failure to claim the prize, implying ignorance of where the game will end, can convey useful information, as it may rule out certain moves. "A gets 1 card, B and C get 3 cards each. What should B, C tell each other, in A's hearing so that they find out the distribution, while A does not?".
Going beyond such puzzles, one might even think about creating new games, and other practices, using dynamic logics as a means of suggesting possibilities, and as a way of keeping our thinking straight about the intended effects.
Conclusion
This paper has sketched a broad view of logic in a setting of communication, computation, and cognition. This merges the traditional analysis of reasoning and definition with that of revising beliefs, planning actions, playing games, and their embedding in longer-term patterns of social behaviour. We gave some examples of how this might be done -but admittedly, most of this is still wishful thinking, rather than solid experience. But then, experience does tell us that wishes may come true...
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